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Abstract
If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much
should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest
is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a
sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend
optimally if I become more inclined to ignore you with each
irrelevant recommendation you make? Finding an answer to
these questions is a key challenge in all forms of marketing
that rely on and explore social ties; ranging from personal
recommendations to viral marketing.
In the first part of this paper, we show that there can be
no pricing mechanism that is “truthful” with respect to the
seller, and we use solution concepts from coalitional game
theory, namely the Core, the Shapley Value, and the Nash
Bargaining Solution, to derive provably “fair” prices for set-
tings with one or multiple recommenders. We then investi-
gate pricing mechanisms for the setting where recommenders
have different “purchase arguments”. Here we show that it
might be beneficial for the recommenders to withhold some of
their arguments, unless anonymity-proof solution concepts,
such as the anonymity-proof Shapley value, are used.
In the second part of this paper, we analyze the setting
where the recommendee loses trust in the recommender for
each irrelevant recommendation. Here we prove that even if
the recommendee regains her initial trust on each successful
recommendation, the expected total profit the recommender
can make over an infinite period is bounded. This can only be
overcome when the recommendee also incrementally regains
trust during periods without any recommendation. Here,
we see an interesting connection to “banner blindness”, sug-
gesting that showing fewer ads can lead to a higher long-term
profit.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you buy a new mobile phone and, simply because
you like it so much, you recommend it to friends, encouraging
them to purchase it as well. Even if you do not recommend
it out of monetary reasons, what would be an adequate and
fair price for the phone manufacturer to pay for your recom-
mendation? If, on the other hand, you recommend a book at
Amazon solely due to the monetary incentive given by Ama-
zon’s referral scheme1 and your friends realize this, then they
are likely to lose trust in your recommendations. Assuming
your friends regain trust whenever you make a relevant rec-
ommendation, how can you maximize your long-term profit,
and is this profit bounded or not? These are the two main
research questions we address in this work.
The importance of “word-of-mouth” (WOM) as a market-
ing channel has long been known [7, 18, 16]. According to [7],
“WOM was seven times as effective as newspapers and mag-
azines, four times as effective as personal selling, and twice
as effective as radio advertising in influencing consumers to
switch brands”. WOM is the causal effect behind “brand
congruence” where friends both in offline [31] and online [36]
social networks tend to use the same products. Recently, a
platform called Friend Vouch [13] was founded around the
idea of personal recommendations. Users of the service can
become “brand ambassadors” who get paid for putting com-
panies in touch with friends. Whether any personal touch
is retained in such a system or whether the person in the
middle is not simply another marketing channel is debatable
and in Section 1.2 we propose a classification schema to shed
light on the differences.
As far as the pricing of recommendations is concerned, one
could argue that honest recommendations should always be
given without any monetary recompensation and that cre-
ating financial incentives could lead to a sell-out of friends.
Although this is a valid concern, we argue that it might still
be worth paying recommenders, even if these are not asking
to be paid. First, even though you might not be profit-
maximizing in a strict sense you are probably more inclined
to mention a certain product if there is some kind of recom-
pensation: you might be honest enough not to recommend a
bad product over a good one for financial reasons, but you
1https://affiliate-program.amazon.com/
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are still more likely to recommend a good product if you
get reimbursed. Second, a fair compensation can lead to in-
creased brand loyalty. If you are already satisfied with the
product then the feeling that the company recompensates
you in a fair and adequate manner is likely to increase your
positive attitude towards the company. On the other hand,
if you are only offered $1 for recommending a particular type
of sports car then this might be viewed as “offensive” and is
arguably worse than not being offered any recompensation.
Especially, as the issue of trust is of utmost relevance in
the realm of personal recommendations, we believe that “fair
pricing” is a cornerstone [32, 24].2 Google e.g. advertises its
Adsense program by claiming to use a Second-Price Auction
to eliminate “that feeling that you’ve paid too much”3. In a
similar spirit, our work on pricing recommendations can be
viewed as trying to eliminate “the feeling that you’ve been
paid too little” for your recommendation.
The second problem we study, relates to scenarios where
the recommender is selfish and only makes paid recommenda-
tions to maximize her own profit. Here, in a sense, the friend
making the recommendation is no more trustworthy or al-
truistic than a web search engine showing sponsored search
results. In these settings we believe the trust between the
recommender and the recommendee to be dissipating. More
concretely we assume that with every unsuccessful recom-
mendation the recommendee becomes more and more likely
to ignore any “advice” given by her friend. We see this as
closely related to “banner blindness” [4, 9, 8], where peo-
ple have become so overloaded and fed up with advertise-
ment that they stop to notice it completely. Seen from this
angle, our findings indicate that advertisers might have to
stop showing advertisements on a regular basis if they want
to retain customers’ trust without seeing click-through-rates
converge to zero.
1.1 Related Work
Even though recommendations can be seen as just another
form of advertising, classical methods for the pricing of ad-
vertising, such as sponsored search auctions [21], are not di-
rectly applicable. This is mainly due to the fact that a true
recommendation should be altruistic and so (i) the recom-
mender is not profit maximizing and (ii) there is only a sin-
gle seller, as an altruistic recommender will not accept “bids”
from multiple sellers. The differences between various kinds
of advertising are described in Section 1.2.
The work that is most closely related to our paper is [3].
There the authors study the sales price of an object as part
of a viral marketing campaign. They assume that all “con-
verted” nodes will try to convert all of their neighbors and
that the conversion probability depends both on the num-
ber of neighbors converted and on the sales price. They do
not consider the problem of how the recommendation itself
should be rewarded. In fact, they mention the problem of
finding optimal “cashbacks” in settings where the nodes be-
have strategically as an open problem.
2Somewhat related is the phenomenon of pay-what-you-like pricing
where people act “irrationally” and choose to pay an adequate amount
[23, 12].
3http://www.google.com/adsense/afs.pdf
The problem of optimal pricing with non-social recom-
mender systems, where the recommendations directly come
from the potential seller, was studied in [5]. Here by “non-
social” we mean “computer-generated” and a typical ex-
ample would be Amazon’s “Customers who bought X also
bought Y”4. The somewhat surprising argument is that cus-
tomers are willing to pay for relevant recommendations as
they create “value by reducing product uncertainty for the
customers”. In this paper, we consider the case where the
recommendations are social and do not come from the seller
directly. Though it is imaginable that the recommendee pays
the recommender for a good recommendation, we do not in-
vestigate the pricing of this possible payment.
It should be clear that we are not addressing the problem
of what to recommend, a problem typically encountered by
stores such as Amazon and usually solved using “collabora-
tive filtering” techniques [35, 17]. In the first part of this
paper (Section 2), we assume that the recommender recom-
mends an item because she believes this item to be of interest
to the recommendee, and the algorithm used by her to de-
termine potential interest is irrelevant. In the second part
(Section 3), the recommender is profit maximizing and now
only cares about the reward offered to her by the seller and
the probability p that the recommendee will buy the item.
In this model the “what” is absorbed into p and the recom-
mender simply decides on when to recommend.
We are also not addressing the topic of how rumors spread
through social networks, or how to identify the best nodes
to target for a viral marketing campaign [10, 19]. Our work
focuses on a single atomic link in the corresponding cascades
of conversions and, in the first part, we ask what a fair price
should be to pay a node for activating one of her neighbors.
In answering this question we limit our attention to the im-
mediate profit of the seller due to the individual sale, and
we do not consider the additional value due to recommenda-
tion cascades caused by the newly activated node. However,
given any algorithm to compute this “higher order” profit,
it can trivially be incorporated into our results. The ques-
tion whether a selfish node should actually try to activate
her neighbors at all is addressed in Section 3.
More generally, in the second part we look at a model
where the recommendee loses trust in the recommender, i.e.
for each unsuccessful recommendation she becomes less and
less inclined to listen to any further suggestion. This is most
likely to appear when the recommendee has the feeling that
the recommendations are “dishonest”. How honest recom-
mendations can be ensured when there are several recom-
menders is studied in [14]. The approach suggested by the
authors involves evaluating/ranking recommenders based on
the rating given to their recommended items by other people.
This motivates recommenders to give good recommendations
in a similar way that Ebay’s rating system gives incentives
for both buyers and sellers “to behave”. This approach, how-
ever, requires a public market where potential buyers can
look for recommendations. This is not the setting of per-
sonal recommendations considered here.
The problem of trust decay is related to “banner blind-
ness” [4, 9, 8], where web users become “blind” to banner ads
4http://www.amazon.com
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due to overexposure. Cast to this setting our mathematical
model suggests that, even if web users’ interest is “refreshed”
by a single relevant advertisement that is clicked, the long
term profit of advertisers will stagnate as click-through-rates
fall to zero. The only possible way out of this dilemma is
to stop showing banner ads for a while so that users can
“unlearn” to ignore all advertising. This approach is also
suggested in a recent patent [30].
In typical literature on sponsored search auctions [21, 20]
it is assumed that the web search engine is optimizing its
expected profit and that its expected profit for showing a
particular ad is the ad’s click-through-rate (CTR) multiplied
by the price the advertiser will be charged when her ad gets
clicked. Usually, only a single round is considered or, when
there are budget constraints [1, 11], the CTRs are assumed
to be constant during the duration of the game. If, however,
it is assumed that CTRs drop for all ads for each unsuc-
cessful advertisement shown then, in the long run, this puts
more emphasis on showing ads with high CTR, regardless of
how much their advertisers can be charged for a single click.
Although different objective functions for the search engine
have been considered [1], the setting of profit maximization
with trust decay has not been studied and we deem this an
interesting area for future work.
Finally, there is previous work that is relevant on a more
technical level. In particular solution concepts such as the
Core [15, 26] or the Shapley-Value [33, 26] have been studied
extensively before. The exact connection to this group of
work will be made clear in the sections with our technical
contributions.
1.2 Classification of Advertising Schemes
One could argue that a recommendation is, ultimately, just
an advertisement and that an advertisement is just a rec-
ommendation. To highlight the differences between different
kinds of advertisement in general, we present a simple clas-
sification scheme.
• Addressing: Personal vs. general. A recommendation is
per se more personal than an advertisement and should
be adapted to reflect the individual needs and interests
of the potential buyer. Classic advertisement is not per-
sonalized and uses the same “message” for everyone.
• Trust: High vs. low. A recommendation should come
from someone the potential buyer trusts and feels loyal
or close to. This can be a personal friend or maybe
a well-respected blogger. In classic advertisement the
information source is viewed as less reputable, though
advertisers try to use trusted icons for their purposes.
• Intention: Altruistic vs. commercial. The intention of
a recommendation by a friend is generally not commer-
cial. She might not get reimbursed at all but she still
recommends something as she believes you would profit
from it. In ordinary advertising the reason for the act
of advertising itself is a commercial one.
The first part of this paper (Section 2) considers the setting
of personal, highly trusted and altruistic recommendations.
The second part (Section 3) then investigates the case of still
personal, but commercial recommendations with a decaying
amount of trust involved. To demonstrate the general ap-
plicability of this schema, we use it to classify a number of
different advertising scenarios.
1. Billboards. A chain of pizza restaurants puts up bill-
boards all over the country, without targeting any spe-
cific group. Addressing: general, trust: low, intention:
commercial.
2. Sponsored search. A web search engine shows targeted
sponsored results in addition to “organic” web search re-
sults, trying to match the searcher’s intent. Addressing:
personal, trust: low, intention: commercial.
3. Testimonial. You liked a book and you write a testimo-
nial on Amazon to convince other unknown readers to
read it, too. Addressing: general, trust: high, intention:
altruistic.
4. Direct recommendation. A friend asks you for advice
on which laptop to buy and you recommend the model
which you believe is best for her. Addressing: personal,
trust: high, intention: altruistic.
Of course, there are lots of other important differences,
e.g. concerning the conversion rates, but we view these dif-
ferences as consequences of the “axiomatic” differences above
and we assume that a personalized, altruistic “advertise-
ment” from a highly trusted source will always have a higher
conversion rate than a general, commercial “recommenda-
tion” from a disreputable source.
Figure 1: Visualization of the four advertising schemes dis-
cussed in the text. Direct recommendation (#4) is the
most successful advertising medium as it dominates all other
schemes in all dimensions.
1.3 Our Contributions and Outline
To the best of our knowledge there has been no work focusing
on either (i) the pricing of recommendations (our Section 2)
or (ii) the strategic behavior of recommenders in a setting
with decaying trust (our Section 3). We view the introduc-
tion of these problems as one of our contributions.
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As far as the pricing of recommendations is concerned we
prove that there can be no pricing mechanism that is “truth-
ful” with respect to the seller (Section 2.1). This shows that
the seller can always pretend to profit less from the recom-
mendations than she actually does to get a larger piece of the
pie. We then apply solution concepts from coalitional game
theory, namely the Core, the Shapley value, and the Nash
Bargaining Solution, to determine provably “fair” prices. For
the Core we find that it typically contains all “individual ra-
tional” payoff vectors, including the payoff vector where the
seller gets everything and the recommenders get nothing. On
the one hand, this demonstrates the weakness of the recom-
menders: They cannot form a coalition with non-zero value
without the seller. On the other hand, it shows that the
Core is essentially useless for deciding how to distribute the
“extra profit” the seller can expect from being recommended
among the recommenders (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1). For the
Shapley value we find that it not only defines unique prices,
but that these prices are also “fair” in a very intuitive way:
The price of a recommendation should be proportional to
the “extra profit” the seller can expect from it (Section 2.2.2
and 2.3.2). For the Nash Bargaining Solution we find that
it yields “fair” prices, namely those obtained by the Shap-
ley value, only if there is a single recommender. Otherwise,
especially in situations where the recommenders do not con-
tribute equally to the “extra profit” of the seller, it may lead
to “unfair” prices (Section 2.2.3 and 2.3.4). Finally, we also
consider the case where each recommendation consists of one
or more “purchase arguments”. Here the ordinary Shapley
value is no longer the method of choice, as withholding argu-
ments might be beneficial for the recommenders. We show
how the anonymity-proof Shapley value from [28] can be ap-
plied to overcome this problem (Section 2.3.3).
In the second part on the strategic behavior of profit max-
imizing recommenders we first show that, not surprisingly,
the total expected profit of the recommender is bounded
when the recommendee can only lose and does not regain
trust (Section 3.2). Then we prove that the total expected
profit is still bounded over an infinite (!) sequence of rec-
ommendations, even when trust is reset to an initial level
on each successful recommendation (Section: 3.3). Finally,
we show that when trust is regained incrementally when no
recommendations are made, the recommender’s optimal to-
tal expected profit is unbounded in the long run and that
she can recommend both too aggressively and too passively
(Section 3.4). These results are also applicable to the phe-
nomenon of “banner blindness”.
2 The Pricing of Recommendations
We model the pricing of recommendations problem as a coali-
tional game with transferable payoff 〈N, v〉, where N is a
finite set (the set of players) and v is a function that asso-
ciates with every non-empty subset S of N (a coalition) a
real number v(S) (the worth of S). We use s to denote the
seller, who is paying for recommendations, and ri to denote
the i-th recommender. There is exactly one product for sale.5
5Note that this does not restrict the generality of our model. It
rather says that each recommendation is for a distinct entity that we
For each coalition S the number v(S) is the total payoff that
is available for division among the members of S. We use
δ ≥ 0 to denote the seller’s margin or gain from selling the
product, i.e. the sales price minus the production cost, and
distinguish three scenarios for v:
• General. Without any recommendation the product is
sold with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. If the recommendersR ⊆
{r1, .., rn} recommend the product, then the probability
that the product is sold is p + f({s} ∪ R), where f :
2N → [0, 1−p] is an arbitrary function with f({s}) = 0.
The following two scenarios are special cases of General.
• Linear. Without any recommendation the product is
sold with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. The recommendation
of the i-th recommender increases this probability by
qi ∈ [0, 1 −
∑
j 6=i qj ]. The joint effect of more than one
recommendation is the sum of the effect of the individual
recommendations. Formally, if the recommenders R ⊆
{r1, .., rn} recommend the product, then the probability
is p+
∑
i:ri∈R
qi.
• Threshold. If less than k recommenders recommend
the product, then the product is sold with probability
p ∈ [0, 1]. If at least k recommenders recommend the
product, then it is sold with probability p + q where
q ∈ [0, 1− p].
We refer to these scenarios as 〈N, v〉 (General), 〈N, v〉 (Lin-
ear), and 〈N, v〉 (Threshold). The following table gives the
worth v(S) of all S ⊆ N = {s, r1, r2} for all three scenarios.
S Linear Threshold General
∅ 0 0 0
{s} pδ pδ pδ
{r1} 0 0 0
{r2} 0 0 0
{s, r1} (p+ q1)δ pδ (p+ f(s, r1))δ
{s, r2} (p+ q2)δ pδ (p+ f(s, r2))δ
{r1, r2} 0 0 0
{s, r1, r2} (p+ q1 + q2)δ (p+ q)δ (p+ f(s, r1, r2))δ
Table 1: Worths v(S) of all possible coalitions S for one seller
s and two recommenders r1 and r2 for our three different
models.
Our goal is to find a payoff vector (xs, xr1 , . . . xrn), where
xs denotes the expected payoff to the seller and xri denotes
the expected payoff to the i-th recommender. Suppose that
the seller s is recommended by all recommenders ri ∈ N\{s},
then the worth of this coalition is v(N) = (p+ f(N)) · δ. We
say that the payoff vector (xs, xr1 , . . . xrn) is feasible if xs +∑
i xri = v(N). A feasible payoff vector, which prescribes
the expected payoff to each player, can be translated into
prices, i.e. payments from the seller to the recommenders,
as follows:
1. Pay-per-Recommendation: The recommender gets paid
by the seller for every recommendation; successful or
not. That is, on every recommendation the seller s pays
the i-th recommender ri the money equivalent of xri .
refer to as a product.
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2. Pay-per-Sale: The recommender gets paid by the seller
for successful recommendations only. That is, on every
successful recommendation the seller s pays the i-th rec-
ommender ri the money equivalent of 1/(p+f(N)) ·xri .
In practice, the Pay-per-Sale approach might be preferable
as, on a successful recommendation, one could reasonably as-
sume p+ f(N) = 1, sidestepping the problem of estimating
f(N) with very little or no data. Note that the prior prob-
ability p is easier to estimate using the seller’s sales record
and click-through or conversion-rates.
2.1 Impossibility Result
Ideally, the payoff vector (xs, xr1 , . . . , xrn) computed by
whatever mechanism should give the seller s, who holds
the private information on p, f , and δ, the incentive to
reveal her information truthfully. Formally, we want that
for all p′, f ′, and δ′ : xs(p, f, δ) ≥ xs(p′, f ′, δ′), where
xs(p, f, δ) = (p+f(N))·δ−
∑
i xri(p, f, δ) and xs(p
′, f ′, δ′) =
(p + f(N)) · δ −
∑
i xri(p
′, f ′, δ′). Unfortunately, as the fol-
lowing theorem shows, the only truthful payoff vector has∑
i xri = 0. That is, the seller gets everything and the rec-
ommenders get nothing.
Theorem 1. There can be no truthful payoff vector (xs, xr1 ,
. . . , xrn) that has
∑
i xri 6= 0 and ensures participation of the
seller s and the recommenders r1 to rn.
Proof. To ensure participation for the seller, we must have
xs(p, f, δ) = (p + f(N)) · δ −
∑
i xri(p, f, δ) ≥ 0 for all p,
f , and δ. To ensure participation for the recommenders r1
to rn we must have
∑
i xri(p, f, δ) ≥ 0 for all p, f , and
δ. Now suppose (xs, xr1 , . . . , xrn) with
∑
i xri 6= 0 was
truthful. It follows that xs(p, f, δ) ≥ xs(p′, f ′, δ′) for all
p′, f ′, and δ′, i.e. (p + f(N)) · δ −
∑
i xri(p, f, δ) ≥ (p +
f(N)) · δ −
∑
i xri(p
′, f ′, δ′). And hence,
∑
i xri(p
′, f ′, δ′) ≥∑
i xri(p, f, δ). But since
∑
i xri(p, f, δ) > 0 there must be
p′, f ′, δ′ such that(p′ + f ′(N)) · δ′ <
∑
i xri(p, f, δ) with∑
i xri(p
′, f ′, δ′) ≤ (p′+ f ′(N)) · δ′ <
∑
i xri(p, f, δ). Contra-
diction!
2.2 One Recommender
We begin by studying the problem of finding “fair” prices
in the setting N = {s, r}, i.e., there is only one seller and
one recommender. In this setting the games 〈N, v〉 (Linear)
and 〈N, v〉 (Threshold) are equivalent. We discuss the so-
lution concepts Core, Shapley value, and Nash Bargaining
Solution. For a more detailed discussion of these solution
concepts see [26, 29].
2.2.1 The Core
The Core [15] of a coalitional game is an outcome of coop-
eration among all players where no coalition of players can
obtain higher payoffs for all of its members. A payoff vector
in the Core is “fair” in the sense that no subset of players
can justifiably argue that they are paid to little, as they are
unable to achieve higher payoffs on their own.
More formally, the Core of the game 〈N, v〉 is the set of
feasible payoff vectors (xi)i∈N for which there is no coalition
S ⊆ N and S-feasible payoff vector (yi)i∈N such that yi > xi
for all i ∈ S. Recall that a payoff vector (xi)i∈N is feasible if∑
i∈N xi = v(N). It is S-feasible if
∑
i∈S xi = V (S).
The Core can be shown to be non-empty by means of
the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [6, 34], which states that
a game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced.
A game 〈N, v〉 is balanced if for every balanced collections
of weights (λS)S⊆N :
∑
S λS · v(S) ≤ v(N). A balanced
collection of weights (λS)S⊆N is a collection of numbers
λS ∈ [0, 1] (one for each coalition S ⊆ N) such that for
all i:
∑
S⊆N :i∈S λS = 1.
Theorem 2. The game 〈{s, r}, v〉 (General) has a non-
empty core.
Proof. Let x ∈ [0, 1]. All balanced collections of weights
(λS)S⊆N are of the form λS = x for S = {s}, {r} and
λS = 1 − x for S = {s, r}. By the Bondareva-Shapley The-
orem, the Core is non-empty if and only if for all values
x ∈ [0, 1] :
x · (v({s}) + v({r})) + (1− x)v({s, r}) ≤ v({s, r}).
For x = 0 this is trivially true. Next we we analyze the case
x > 0. Since v({r}) = 0 and v({s, r})− v({s}) = f(s, r) · δ,
x · v({s})− x · v({s, r}) ≤ 0
⇔ v({s, r})− v({s}) ≥ 0
⇔ f({s, r}) · δ ≥ 0.
Since f({s, r}) ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 this is always true.
Recall that the games 〈N, v〉 (Linear) and 〈N, v〉 (Thresh-
old) are special cases of the game 〈N, v〉 (General) and so
Theorem 2 also shows non-emptiness of the Core for these
games. Next we give necessary and sufficient conditions for
a payoff vector (xs, xr1 , . . . , xrn) to be in the Core.
Theorem 3. The payoff vector ((p+f({s, r}))δ−x, x) is in
the Core of the game 〈{s, r}, v〉 (General) if and only if:
0 ≤ x ≤ f({s, r}) · δ.
Proof. Let xs = (p + f({s, r}))δ − x and let xr = x. If the
vector (xs, xr) is in the Core of the game 〈{s, r}, v〉 (General),
then there exists no coalition S ⊆ N = {s, r} and an S-
feasible payoff vector y = (ys, yr) such that yi > xi for all
i ∈ S. That is, for all S ⊆ N and S-feasible payoff vectors
y = (ys, yr) we have that yi ≤ xi for all i ∈ S. For S = {s, r}
this means that ys + yr = v({s, r}) ≤ xs + xr = v({s, r})
(which is trivially true). For S = {s} this means that ys =
v({s}) = p·δ ≤ xs = (p+f({s, r}))·δ−x, i.e. x ≤ f({s, r})·δ.
For S = {r} this means that yr = v({r}) = 0 ≤ xr = x, i.e.
x ≥ 0. That is, 0 ≤ x ≤ f({s, r}) · δ.
For the reverse direction assume by contradiction that 0 ≤
x ≤ f({s, r}) ·δ but that (xs, rr) is not in the Core, i.e. there
exists a coalition S ⊆ N = {s, r} and a S-feasible payoff
vector y = (ys, yr) such that yi > xi for all i ∈ S. We cannot
have S = {s, r} as then ys + yr = v({s, r}) > xs + xr =
v({s, r}), which gives a contradiction. But if S = {s}, then
5
ys = v({s}) = p · δ > xs = (p + f({s, r})) · δ − x, i.e. x >
f({s, r}) · δ, which gives a contradiction. Finally, if S = {r},
then yr = v({r}) = 0 > xr = x, i.e. x < 0, which also gives
a contradiction.
For the games 〈{s, r}, v〉 (Linear) and 〈{s, r}, v〉 (Thresh-
old) this means that ((p + q)δ − x, x) is in the core if and
only if:
0 ≤ x ≤ q · δ.
This implies that any “feasible” payoff vector is in the Core.
The only restriction on the payoff vector is that the payoff
to the recommender be non-negative and in expectation no
higher than the “extra profit” the seller can expect from the
recommendation. In particular, a payoff vector that gives ev-
erything to the seller and nothing to the recommender would
be in the Core. This demonstrates the weakness of the recom-
menders: They cannot form a coalition with non-zero value
without the seller.
2.2.2 Shapley Value
One problem with the Core is that it does not assign a unique
payoff vector to a game. This makes it necessary to have
another criterion for choosing a payoff vector. The Shapley
value [33] is a solution concept that assigns to each game
a unique, provably fair payoff vector. In general, a value
φ : v → Rn+1 maps each game 〈N, v〉 to a unique vector
φ(v); the i-th entry φi(v) of this vector being the expected
payoff to player i. The Shapley value is the unique value
satisfying the following axioms:
1. Symmetry: If player i and j are interchangeable, then
φi(v) = φj(v). Formally, if for every S ⊆ N s.t. i ∈ S,
j 6∈ S: v((S \ {i}) ∪ {j}) = v(S), then φi(v) = φj(v).
2. Dummy: If player i’s contribution to any coalition S is
zero, then φi(v) = 0. Formally, if for every S ⊆ N \ {i}:
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S), then φi(v) = 0.
3. Additivity: Player i’s entry φi(v) should be additive in v.
Formally, if 〈N, v+w〉 is derived from 〈N, v〉 and 〈N,w〉
by defining (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ⊆ N ,
then φi(v + w) = φi(v) + φi(w) for all i ∈ N .
These axioms can be interpreted as formalizing a notion of
“fairness”, that postulates that the expected payoff to player
i be proportional to player i’s contribution to the outcome
of the game. For an analysis along these lines see [25].
Definition 1. The Shapley value φ(v) = (φ1(v), . . . , φN (v))
of the game 〈N, v〉 is defined as follows:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!
|N |!
· (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
One interpretation of this is: Suppose that all the players
are arranged in some order, all orders being equally likely,
then φi(v) is the expected marginal contribution of player i
to the set of players who precede her.
Theorem 4. Consider the game 〈{s, r}, v〉 (General). The
Shapley value φ(v) = (φs(v), φr(v)) is given by
φs(v) = pδ +
1
2
f({s, r})δ and φr(v) =
1
2
f({s, r})δ.
Proof. The claim follows from the definition of the game
〈{s, r}, v〉 (General) and Definition 1. Note that the worths
v(S) of all S ⊆ N = {s, r} can be read from Table 1 by
treating r1 as r and ignoring rows containing r2.
For the game 〈{s, r}, v〉 (Linear, Threshold) this means
that
φs(v) = pδ +
1
2
qδ and φr(v) =
1
2
qδ.
This shows that the payoff to the recommender should be
proportional to her contribution to the seller’s expected “ex-
tra profit”. In particular, it shows that the recommender’s
payoff should be linear in her contribution to the purchase
probability, i.e. f({s, r}), and also in the seller’s margin or
gain δ. This is consistent with “real life” pricing schemes
that redeem the recommender with a certain percentage of
the sales price [22], assuming that for a given product family
the margin is proportional to the sales price.
2.2.3 The Nash Bargaining Solution
The last solution concept that we discuss in this section is
the Nash Bargaining Solution [27].6 The basic idea here is
to view the game 〈N, v〉 as a bargaining problem over a set
F of feasible payoff vectors f = (f0, . . . , fn) and a dedicated
payoff vector d = (d0, . . . , dn); the payoff vector in case of a
disagreement. A solution is a function φ : (F, d) → F. The
Nash Bargaining Solution is the unique solution satisfying
the following axioms:
1. Pareto Efficiency. There is no f ∈ F such that fi ≥
φi(F, d) for all i ∈ N and fj > φj(F, d) for at least one
j ∈ N.
2. Individual Rationality. For all i ∈ N : φi(F, d) ≥ di.
3. Scale Covariance. If F ′ = {(λ0 · f0 + γ0, . . . , λn · fn +
γn) | (f0, . . . , fn) ∈ F} and d′ = (λ0 · d0 + γ0, . . . , λn ·
dn + γn), then φ(F
′, d′) = (λ0 · φ0(F, d) + γ0, . . . , λn ·
φn(F, d) + γn).
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If F ′ ⊆ F and
φ(F, d) ∈ F ′, then φ(F ′, d) = φ(F, d).
5. Symmetry. If (f0, . . . , fi, . . . , fj , . . . , fn) ∈ F implies
(f0, . . . , fj , . . . , fi, . . . , fn) ∈ F and di = dj , then
φi(F, d) = φj(F, d).
The Nash Bargaining solution is “fair” in the sense that is
Pareto effcient, i.e. it is impossible to improve the payoff of
one or more players without hurting that of others. One can
show that it satisfies φ(F, d) ∈ argmaxf∈F
∏
i(fi − di) [26].
We use this to prove:
6The only connection between this solution concept and the concept
of a Nash equilibrium [26, 29] is John F. Nash.
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Theorem 5. For 〈{s, r}, v〉 (General) let F = {(fs, fr) |
fs ≥ 0, fr ≥ 0 and fs + fr = (p + f({s, r})) · δ} and d =
(ds, dr) = (p · δ, 0). Then,
φ(F, d) = ((p+
1
2
f({s, r})δ,
1
2
f({s, r})δ).
For the game 〈{s, r}, v〉 (Linear, Threshold) this means
that:
φ(F, d) =
((
p+
1
2
q
)
δ,
1
2
qδ
)
.
This demonstrates that the Nash Bargaining Solution and
the Shapley value coincide in our model. On the one hand,
this is surprising as the axioms used to define the Shapley
value and the Nash Bargaining Solution are quite different.
On the other hand, this is intuitive as for two players there is
only one non-trivial coalition to be considered for the Shapley
value. So if this two-player coalition leads to a bigger payoff
P than the sum of its two non-cooperative “atoms”, then the
different symmetry axioms present in both solution concepts
imply that this surplus should be divided 50-50. This holds
as long as the feasible payoff vectors are F = {(f0, f1)|f0 +
f1 ≤ P}, and so (f0, f1) ∈ F ⇔ (f1, f0) ∈ F , but would stop
to hold if, e.g. there were additional constraints on F such as
f0 ≥ 2 · f1. In such cases, the symmetry axiom of the Nash
Bargaining Solution no longer applies.
2.3 Many Recommenders
Next we study the problem of finding “fair” prices in the
more general setting N = {s, r1, . . . , rn}, i.e. there is one
seller and n ≥ 1 recommenders. Note that in this setting the
games 〈N, v〉 (Linear) and 〈N, v〉 (Threshold) are no longer
equivalent. As in the setting where N = {s, r} we study the
solution concepts Core, Shapley value, and Nash Bargaining
Solution.
2.3.1 The Core
Recall that the Core of the game 〈N, v〉 comprises all feasible
payoff vectors with which no coalition S ⊆ N is “unhappy”
meaning that the players in S cannot break away to obtain
a higher payoff on their own. For a formal definition of the
Core (and related definitions) see Section 2.2.1.
Theorem 6. The game 〈N, v〉 (General) has a non-empty
core iff for every balanced collections of weights (λS)S⊆N :∑
S⊂N :s∈S
[λS(f(N)− f(S))] ≥ 0.
Proof. Let (λS)S⊆N be a balanced collection of weights.
Since v(S) = 0 whenever s 6∈ S, applying the Bondareva-
Shapley Theorem [6, 34] to the game 〈N, v〉 (General) gives:∑
S⊆N :s∈S
[λS(p+ f(S))] ≤ p+ f(N).
Since (λS)S⊆N is a balanced collections of weights, we have∑
S⊆N :s∈S λS = 1 and λN = 1 −
∑
S⊂N :s∈S λS . It follows
that: ∑
S⊆N :s∈S
λS · f(S) ≤ f(N).
⇔
∑
S⊂N :s∈S
[λS(f(S)− f(N))] + f(N) ≤ f(N)
⇔
∑
S⊂N :s∈S
[λS(f(N)− f(S))] ≥ 0.
The condition given by Theorem 6 holds trivially for 〈N, v〉
(General) if f(N) ≥ f(S) for all S ⊆ N since all the λS values
are non-negative. For the game 〈N, v〉 (Linear) and 〈N, v〉
(Threshold) this means that the core is always non-empty
since qi ≥ 0 for all i respectively q > 0.
Theorem 7. Consider the game 〈N, v〉 (General). The pay-
off vector (xs = (p + f(N)) · δ −
∑
i xri , xr1 , . . . , xrn) is in
the Core if and only if for all T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T :
0 ≤
∑
ri∈T
xri ≤ (f(N)− f(N \ T )) · δ.
Proof. Assume that the payoff vector (xs = (p+ f(N)) · δ −∑
i xri , xr1 , . . . , xrn) is in the Core. Since v(S) = 0 for all
coalitions S ⊆ N such that s 6∈ S, it follows that:
1. For all S ⊆ N such that s ∈ S :
(p+ f(N))δ −
∑
ri∈N
xi +
∑
ri∈S
xi ≥ v(S)
⇔ (p+ f(N))δ −
∑
ri∈N\S
xi ≥ (p+ f(S))δ
⇔ (f(N)− f(S))δ ≥
∑
ri∈N\S
xi
2. For all S ⊆ N such that s 6∈ S:∑
ri∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ⇔
∑
ri∈S
xi ≥ 0.
With T = N \ S in 1. and T = S in 2. it follows that 0 ≤∑
ri∈T
xri ≤ (f(N)− f(N \ T )) · δ for all T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T .
For the reverse direction assume by contradiction that 0 ≤∑
ri∈T
xri ≤ (f(N) − f(N \ T )) · δ for all T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T
but that (xs = (p + f(N)) · δ −
∑
i xri , xr1 , . . . , xrn) is not
in the Core, i.e. there exists a coalition S ⊆ N and an S-
feasible payoff vector y = (ys, yr1 , . . . , yrn) in which yk > xk
for all players k in S. Since y is S-feasible, the total payoff∑
k∈S yk to the players in S must equal v(S). Since yp > xp
for all players p in S, we must have
∑
k∈S yk >
∑
k∈S xk.
Thus, v(S) >
∑
k∈S xk.
Case 1: If s ∈ S, since v(S) = (p+f(S))·δ and
∑
k∈S xk =
(p+ f(N))δ −
∑
ri∈N\S
xri , this means that:
(p+ f(S)) · δ > (p+ f(N))δ −
∑
ri∈N\S
xri
⇔
∑
ri∈N\S
xri > (f(N)− f(S)) · δ.
With T = N \ S this gives a contradiction to the fact that
for all T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T :
∑
ri∈T
xri ≤ (f(N)− f(N \ T )) · δ.
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Case 2: If s 6∈ S, since v(S) = 0 and
∑
k∈S xk =∑
ri∈S
xri , this means that:
v(S) = 0 >
∑
ri∈S
xri .
With T = S this gives a contradiction to the fact that for all
T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T :
∑
ri∈T
xri ≥ 0.
For the game 〈N, v〉 (Linear) this means that the payoff
vector (xs = (p +
∑
i qi) · δ −
∑
i xri , xr1 , . . . , xrn) is in the
Core if and only if for all T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T :
0 ≤
∑
ri∈T
xri ≤
(∑
ri∈T
qi
)
· δ.
For the game 〈N, v〉 (Threshold) this means that the payoff
vector (xs = (p+ q)δ −
∑
i xri , xr1 , . . . , xrn) is in the Core if
and only if for all T ⊆ N s.t. s 6∈ T :
0 ≤
∑
ri∈T
xi ≤
{
0 , if |T | ≤ n− k
q · δ , if |T | > n− k
.
This means that for 〈N, v〉 (Linear) and 〈N, v〉 (Threshold)
with k = n a certain payoff vector is in the core precisely if
no coalition of recommenders receives more than their joint
contribution to the seller’s expected “extra profit”. For the
game 〈N, v〉 (Threshold) with k < n this means that xri = 0
for all i (with T = {ri}) and, thus, the only payoff vector in
the Core is ((p+ q)δ, 0, . . . , 0), i.e. the seller gets everything
and the recommenders get nothing.
2.3.2 Shapley Value
Recall that the Shapley value assigns to each game a unique
payoff vector that is “fair” as it satisifies the Symmetry,
Dummy, and Additivity axioms. For a formal definition of
the Shapley value (and related definitions) see Section 2.2.2.
Theorem 8. Consider the game 〈N, v〉 (General). The
Shapley value φ(v) = (φs(v), φr1(v), . . . , φrn(v)) is given by
φs(v) = pδ +
∑
S⊆N\{s}
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!
|N |!
f(S ∪ {s})δ
φri(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{ri}:
s∈S
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!
|N |!
(f(S ∪ {ri})− f(S))δ.
Proof. The claim follows from the definition of the game
〈N, v〉 (General) and Definition 1. The worths v(S) of all
S ⊆ N = {s, r1, r2} are given explicitly in Table 1. For
|N | > 3 the worths v(S) are obtained similarly.
For the game 〈N, v〉 (Linear) this means that
φs(v) = pδ +
1
2
∑
i
qiδ and
φri(v) =
1
2
qiδ for all i.
For the game 〈N, v〉 (Threshold) this means that
φs(v) = pδ +
(
1− n
k!(n− k)!
(n+ 1)!
)
qδ and
φri(v) =
k!(n− k)!
(n+ 1)!
qδ for all i.
This suggests that in the game 〈N, v〉 (Linear) each individ-
ual recommender should receive a share of exactly one half
of her contribution to the expected “extra profit” of the rec-
ommender. For the game 〈N, v〉 (Threshold) the fraction
k!(n− k)!/(n+1)! is exactly the fraction of times where this
recommender’s recommendation “makes a difference”. So
all in all the Shapley value does not only give a unique pay-
off vector, but it also yields “fair” payoffs in the sense that
the payoff to each recommender is proportional to the rec-
ommender’s contribution to the “extra profit” the seller can
expect.
2.3.3 Anonymity-Proof Shapley Value
What would be a “fair” payoff vector if each recommendation
was a collection of arguments? A straightforward approach
would be to compute the Shapley value on the basis of ar-
guments and to redeem recommender ri with
∑
a∈Si
φa(v),
where a is an argument from the set of arguments A and Si is
the set of arguments that recommender ri possesses; the sets
Si being disjoint. The problem with this approach, however,
is that it might be beneficial for a recommender to withhold
some of her arguments:
Example 1. Let A = {a, b, c}, v({a, b}) = v({a, c}) =
v({a, b, c}) = 1, and v({a}) = v({b}) = v({c}) = v({b, c}) =
0. Let S1 = {a} and S2 = {b, c}. Then r1 gets φa(v) =
1
2 and
r2 gets φb(v) + φc(v) =
1
6 +
1
6 =
1
3 .
Example 2. Let A′ = {a, b}, v({a, b}) = 1, and v({a}) =
v({b}) = 0. Let S1 = {a} and S2 = {b}. Then r1 gets φa(v) =
1
2 and r2 gets φb(v) =
1
2 . I.e. r2 would be better off.
The anonymity-proof Shapley value [28] cannot be “tricked”
in this way. It is defined as follows:
Definition 2. For any set A′ ⊆ A of declared arguments the
anonymity-proof Shapley value ψa(v) for a ∈ A′ is:
ψa(v) =
φa(v)∑
a′∈A′ φa′(v)
v(A′).
So a better way to redeem the recommenders would be to
compute the anonymity-proof Shapley value ψa(v) for each
argument a ∈ A′ and to give each recommender
∑
a∈Si
ψa(v).
With this approach r1 and r2 would get ψa = 3/5 and ψb(v)+
ψc(v) = 2/5 in Example 1 and ψa = 3/4 and ψb(v) = 1/4 <
2/5 in Example 2.
2.3.4 The Nash Bargaining Solution
Recall that the Nash Bargaining Solution is defined as the
unique bargaining solution that satisfies the axioms listed in
Section 2.2.3.
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Theorem 9. For 〈N, v〉 (General) let F = {(fs, fr1 , . . . ,
frn) |fs ≥ 0, fri ≥ 0 (∀ i) and fs +
∑
i fri = (p+ f(N)) · δ}
and d = (ds, dr1 , . . . , drn) = (p · δ, 0, . . . , 0). Then,
φs(F, d) = (p+
1
n+ 1
f(N)) · δ and
φri(F, d) =
1
n+ 1
f(N) · δ. for all i.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that φ(F, d) ∈
argmaxf∈F
∏
i(fi − di) [26].
One problem with the Nash Bargaining Solution is that
it completely ignores the possibility of cooperation among
subsets of players. To see that this may lead to “unfair”
prices, consider the game 〈N, v〉 (Linear) with one seller s
and two recommenders r1 and r2. Suppose that q1 = 1−p−ǫ
and that q2 = ǫ for some some small ǫ > 0. It follows that
φr1(F, d) = φr2(F, d) =
1−p
2 , i.e. the expected payoff to both
recommenders is the same. But since r1’s contribution to the
expected worth of the grand coalition is significantly higher
than that of r2 (especially as ǫ→ 0), this cannot be regarded
as “fair”. We conclude that for |N | > 2 it is not advisable
to use the Nash Bargaining Solution to guide the pricing of
recommendations.
3 Recommending Strategically
We study the following problem: There are n products. For
each product the recommender has two options: “recom-
mend it” or “not recommend it”. A recommendation is suc-
cessful if the buyer buys the product. For a successful rec-
ommendation the recommender gets a constant reward of r
and this reward is the same for all products. Initially, the
probability p of success is p0 < 1. With each unsuccessful
recommendation this probability drops from its current value
to p = l · p, where l < 1 is the loss rate. The probability p
can be seen as an estimate of the recommendee’s trust in
the recommender and a high value of l corresponds to a slow
loss in trust. This basic model is analyzed in Section 3.2. We
also consider extensions of this model where trust (= p) can
increase again in two ways. First, we assume that p is reset
to p = p0 on each successful recommendation. This setting
we refer to as “with reset” and it is analyzed in Section 3.3.
Second, we introduce a factor g ≥ 1 and each time the rec-
ommender does not recommend anything trust is regained
and p is updated to p = min(g · p, p0). This setting we re-
fer to as “with recovery” when g > 1 and it is analyzed in
Section 3.4.
In all settings the recommender’s sole goal is to maximize
the overall expected rewardMn(p0, l, g) for the given param-
eters p0, l and g. We are interested in the asymptotic behav-
ior of Mn(p0, l, g), i.e. in R(p0, l, g) = limn→∞Mn(p0, l, g).
Before looking at the theoretical analysis, the following sec-
tion experimentally demonstrates the different behavior of
the optimal total expected reward in these settings.
3.1 Experimental Results
Figure 2 gives experimental results for n = 200, r = 1,
p0 = 0.5, l = 0.66, g = 1 (in the setting “without recov-
ery”) and g = 1.33 (in the setting “with recovery”). It shows
that the expected reward of the optimal strategy converges
in the setting “without recovery” and diverges in the setting
“with recovery”. In the setting “without recovery” the ex-
pected reward converges to 2.25 if the probability of success
is not reset and to 5 if it is reset to p0 on a single successful
recommendation. The figure also shows that the expected
reward of the heuristic “recommend product 1, k+1, 2k+1,
etc.” converges for k = 2 where l · gk < 1 and diverges for
k = 3 and 4 where l · gk > 1. Finally, it shows that the
expected reward grows faster for k = 3 than for k = 4.
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Figure 2: Without any recovery (red and green lines) the
total expected reward converges. This also holds, even with
recovery, for the “aggressive” heuristic (purple line) which
recommends every second item. The other three settings,
described in detail in Section 3.1, lead to an asymptotically
unbounded reward.
3.2 Without Reset, without Recovery
Here we consider the case where g = 1 (= no recovery)
and assume that the probability of success is not reset
to p0 on a successful recommendation. As the probabil-
ity of success remains unchanged if no recommendation is
given, the optimal strategy is to recommend all products.
Therefore we can rewrite R(p0, l) := R(p0, l, 1) as follows:
R(p0, l) = p0(r + R(p0, l)) + (1 − p0)R(lp0, l), which we can
solve analytically.
R(p0, l) =
p0
1− p0
r +R(p0 · l, l)
=
p0
1− p0
r +
p0 · l
1− p0
r +R(p0 · l
2, l)
=
p0
1− p0
·
∞∑
i=0
li · r =
p0
1− p0
·
1
1− l
· r <∞.
So, not surprisingly, if trust can only be lost and if both
the initial trust p0 and the loss rate l are strictly smaller
than 1, then the total expected reward the recommender can
achieve is finite, even when there is an infinite sequence of
items to recommend.
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3.3 With Reset, without Recovery
Now let us analyze the case where still g = 1 (= no recovery)
but each successful recommendation leads to reset of p to p0.
Again, the optimal strategy is to recommend all products as
there is no gain from not recommending. In this setting, we
can rewriteR(p0, l) as follows: R(p0, l) = (1−q)·(r+R(p0, l)),
where q denotes the probability that there will be not a single
successful recommendation over the infinite sequence. This
recurrence can be solved (i.e. limn→∞Mn(p0, l) is finite) if
and only if q > 0.
Lemma 1. Let dilog(x) =
∫ 1
x
ln(t)
1−t dt and c = max(p0, l).
Then, for all 1 > p0 ≥ 0, q ≥ (1 − c)exp
(
dilog(1−c)
ln(c)
)
> 0.
Proof. The probability that there will be not a single suc-
cessful recommendation is:
q =
∞∏
k=0
(1− lk · p0) ≥
∞∏
k=0
(1− ck+1).
Hence it suffices to show that
∏∞
k=0(1 − c
k+1) > 0. Taking
the ln( ) of both sides we get
ln
(
∞∏
k=0
(1− ck+1)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
ln(1− ck+1) > −∞,
where we need to prove this inequality. Note that the ex-
pression ln(1 − ck+1) is strictly increasing in k and hence
ln(1− ck+1) ≥
∫ k
k−1
ln(1− cx+1) dx. This gives the bound
∞∑
k=0
ln(1− ck+1) = ln(1− c) +
∞∑
k=1
ln(1− ck+1)
≥ ln(1− c) +
∞∑
k=1
∫ k
x=k−1
ln(1 − cx+1) dx
= ln(1− c) +
∞∑
k=0
∫ k+1
x=k
ln(1− cx+1) dx
= ln(1− c) +
∫ ∞
x=0
ln(1− cx+1) dx.
Recall that dilog(x) =
∫ 1
x
ln(t)
1−t dt. The indefinite integral of
ln(1− x) is −dilog(1− x)/ ln(x). We get∫ ∞
x=0
ln(1− ck+1) dx =
dilog(1 − c)
ln(c)
− lim
x→∞
dilog(1 − cx+1)
ln(c)
.
Since dilog(x) is continuous7 and dilog(1) = 0 (see Lemma
2), we get∫ ∞
x=0
ln(1− ck+1) dx =
dilog(1 − c)
ln(c)
−
dilog(1)
ln(c)
=
dilog(1 − c)
ln(c)
.
For 0 < x < 1 we have 0 ≤ dilog(1 − x) < 2e−1 + 1 (see
Lemma 2). For 0 < x < 1 we have ln(x) < 0. It follows that∫∞
x=0
ln(1− ck+1) dx > −∞.
7It is even differentiable as it is defined as an indefinite integral.
Lemma 2. Let dilog(x) =
∫ x
1
ln(t)
1−t dt. Then dilog(x) is
monotonously decreasing and 0 ≤ dilog(x) < 2e−1 + 1.
In fact, the tight upper bound of dilog(x) ≤ π2/6 < 2e−1+
1 is known [2], but we choose to give the following elementary
proof of Lemma 2 to have a self-contained argument.
Proof. Let f(t) = − ln(t)/(1 − t). Then f ′(t) = −(1
t
(1 −
t) + ln(t))/(1 − t)2 < 0 for 0 < t < 1. So
∫ 1
t=x
f(t)dt <∫ e−1
t=x
f(t)dt+ (1− e−1)f(e−1). For 0 < t ≤ e−1 we also have
f(t) ≤ − ln(t)/(1 − e−1). So,
∫ e−1
t=x
f(t)dt ≤ [t − t · ln(t)]e
−1
x .
This is largest when x → 0 where the whole expression be-
comes 2e−1 and so
∫ 1
t=x f(t)dt < 2e
−1 + 1 for 0 ≤ x < 1.
Note that f(t) is continuous at t = 1 with limx→1 f(t) = 1
(using e.g. the l’Hopital Rule). So trivially dilog(1) = 0. As
f(t) > 0 this gives the desired lower bound.
Using Lemma 1 we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Let dilog(x) =
∫ 1
x
ln(t)
1−t dt, c = max(p0, l), and
δ(c) = (1− c)exp(dilog(1− c)/ ln(c)). Then, for all 1 > p0 ≥
0,
R(p0, l) ≤
1− δ(c)
δ(c)
· r <∞.
This proves that even if the probability of success is reset to
p0 on a single successful recommendation, the total expected
reward over an infinite period is bounded.
3.4 With Reset, with Recovery
Finally, we consider the setting where g > 1 (= with recov-
ery). Here the probability of success is set to min(p0, g · p)
if no recommendation was given. Hence it might be better
not to recommend all products to avoid that that proba-
bility p converges to zero. Let Mn(p0, l, g) denote the ex-
pected reward of the optimal strategy. To obtain bounds
for Mn(p0, l, g), let us consider, as a heuristic, the algorithm
A(k) that recommends product 1, k+1, 2k+1, etc. We write
A
(k)
n (p0, l, g) to denote this algorithm’s expected profit.
Theorem 11. Let ψ be the smallest integer such that l ·gψ ≥
1. If k > ψ, then, for all 1 > p0, l > 0 and ∞ > g ≥ 1,
A(k)n (p0, l, g) = ⌊
n
k
⌋ · p0 · r.
Proof. The expected reward for the first recommendation is
p0 · r. Since k > ψ, the expected reward for every other
recommendation is also min(p0, p0 · l · gk−1) = p0 · r. Since
there are exactly ⌊n/k⌋ recommendations, this shows that
A
(k)
n (p0, l, g) = ⌊
n
k
⌋ · p0 · r.
This is instructive as it shows that (a) for k > ψ the ex-
pected reward A
(k)
n (p0, l, g) of A
(k) does not converge as n
tends to infinity and (b) for k′ > k > ψ the expected re-
ward A
(k′)
n (p0, l, g) of A
(k′) grows slower (and is ultimately
lower) than the expected reward A
(k)
n (p0, l, g) of A
(k). Since
the reward Mn(p0, l, g) of the optimal strategy is at least
as high, this also shows non-convergence of R(p0, l, g) =
limn→∞Mn(p0, l, g) =∞.
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Theorem 12. Let ψ be the smallest integer such that l ·gψ ≥
1. If k ≤ ψ, then, for all 1 > p0, l > 0 and ∞ > g ≥ 1, there
exist p′0 and l
′ such that
lim
n→∞
A(k)n (p0, l, g) ≤ lim
n→∞
Mn(p
′
0, l
′) <∞.
Proof. If k < ψ, then the profit maximization problem with
parameters p0, l, and g on the products 1, 2, 3, etc. is equiv-
alent to the profit maximization problem with parameters
p′0 = p0, l
′ = l · gk−1 < 1, and g′ = 1 on the products 1,
k + 1, 2k + 1, etc. The claim follows from Theorem 10.
Whereas Theorem 11 shows that recommending too sel-
domly is sub-optimal, Theorem 12 shows that recommending
too often is even worse.
4 Discussion and Future Work
Suppose you recommend a product to a friend and the seller
of the product offers to pay you for your recommendation.
What would be a “good” price? Our first finding was that the
only “truthful” price would be zero. The problem with this,
however, is that if you do not get paid, then you might as
well decide not to recommend the product. And so the seller
might be willing to pay you a “fair” price. We approached the
problem of finding “fair” prices by studying solution concepts
from coalitional game theory such as the Core, the Shapley
value, and the Nash Bargaining Solution. Since each of these
solution concepts formalizes some notion of “fairness”, these
prices can be regarded as provably “fair”. We view such an
“axiomatic” foundation of “fairness” to be the only viable
basis for truely “fair” prices in practice.
Now suppose that you get paid for each succesful recom-
mendation you make, and that you want to maximize the
amount of money paid to you. At first sight, it might ap-
pear that the best strategy for you is to send out as many
recommendations to as many friends as possible. But, then,
just as you get “blind” when being shown too many ads,
your friends will probably start to ignore your “recommen-
dations”. We adressed this problem by modeling the loss
in “trust” by a drop in “purchase probability” on each un-
succesful recommendation. Our main finding here was that,
even if the “trust” in you is reset to the initial level on a sin-
gle successful recommendation, the total expected profit you
can make over an infinite period of time is bounded. This
can only be overcome if the recomendee also incrementally
regains “trust” over periods without any recommendation.
We believe that our work motivates a number of inter-
esting research questions. E.g.: What are “good” pricing
mechanisms in settings where the seller has objectives such
as maintaining the buyer’s “trust”? How exactly do web
users respond to being shown irrelevant advertisements? Is
it possible to revive their interest in banner ads? What are
“optimal” auction mechanisms for sponsored search when the
click-through-rates are non-constant and decay with each ir-
relevant advertisement being shown?
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